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Abstract
In spite of ﬁat money is useless in a standard Arrow-Debreu model, in this paper
we will show that this does not hold true anymore when goods are indivisible. In our
setting, although ﬁat money yields no utility, its price will always be positive and the
set of equilibrium allocations changes with the distribution of ﬁat money. Its role lies
in the fact that it could be used to facilitate exchange. Since a Walras equilibrium does
not always exist when goods are indivisible, a new equilibrium concept - called rationing
equilibrium - is introduced and its existence is proven under weak assumptions on the
economy. A Walras equilibrium exists generically on the distribution of ﬁat money.
Keywords: competitive equilibrium, indivisible goods, ﬁat money.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C62, D50
1 Introduction
Most economic models assume that goods in the economy are perfectly divisible. The rational
behind this assumption is that the commodities one usually considers are almost perfectly
divisible in the sense that the minimal unit of the good is insigniﬁcant enough so that its
indivisibility can be neglected. So one should be able to approximate an economy, with a
small enough level of indivisibility of goods, by some idealized economy where goods are
perfectly divisible. A competitive equilibrium of this idealized economy should thus be an
approximation of some competitive outcome of the economy with indivisible goods.
The question arises what the Walras equilibrium with perfectly divisible goods is supposed
to approximate - simply a Walras equilibrium of an economy with indivisible goods? Surely
not, since is well known that a Walras equilibrium may fail to exist in the absence of perfectly
divisible goods, and even the core may be empty (see Henry (1970) and Shapley and Scarf
(1974) respectively). These facts are certainly due to some economic phenomena which
cannot be modelled with the standard approach. Consequently, a richer notion of competitive
equilibrium is needed, which exists even when goods are indivisible. This new notion will be
called rationing equilibrium.
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1In order to deﬁne the rationing equilibrium, we will develop a model where (i) goods are
indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the aggregate level of the economy;
(ii) ﬁat money is used only to facilitate the exchange among consumers; and (iii) we introduce
a regularized notion of demand which will be an upper semi-continuous correspondence in
our framework.
With respect to (i), we proceed considering a model where there are a ﬁnite number of
types of consumers, and for each type there are a continuum of individuals. The justiﬁcation
for this hypothesis comes from the fact that if some consumer would own a commodity which
may not be considered negligible at the level of the entire economy, it would be hard to justify
that this consumer acts as a price taker.
With respect to (ii), is clear that in presence of divisible goods, it could be diﬃcult for
agents to execute net-exchanges worth exactly zero. Already, Adam Smith (1776) considered
the possibility for ﬁat money to facilitate exchange of indivisible goods as one of its crucial
roles. Similarly to Dr` eze and M¨ uller (1980) we introduce a slack parameter in the economy.
In our case, this parameter can be identiﬁed as ﬁat money, whose unique role will be to
facilitate the exchange of goods among individuals. Indeed, ﬁat money has no intrinsic value
whatsoever, since in our model it does not enter in consumers’ preferences. The last fact is
a crucial diﬀerence with several contributions on indivisible goods, as we will see later on.
Finally, related with (iii), we point out that in presence of indivisible goods, the Walrasian
demand is, in general, not an upper semi-continuous correspondence. Therefore Walras
equilibria do not always exist. We introduce a regularized notion of demand, that will be a
building block to deﬁne the rationing equilibrium notion.
The main results of this paper is the demonstration of the existence of a rationing equi-
librium with a strictly positive price of ﬁat money. Fiat money having a positive price is a
nice by-product of our approach which may look surprising (cf. Hahn (1965)). In fact, in the
literature we can ﬁnd several approaches that setup diﬀerent models in order to guarantee the
positiveness of price of ﬁat money. For example, the inﬁnite horizon model with overlapping
generations (Samuelson (1958), Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980), Balasko and Shell (1981)) or
with inﬁnitely lived agents (e.g. Bewley (1980, 1983), Gale and Hellwig (1984)). In a static
or ﬁnite horizon model, one may consider money lump-sum taxation with a zero total money
supply (Lerner (1947), Balasko and Shell (1986)). Finally, Clower (1967) proposed a cash in
advance constraint to study similar problems (complementarily, see Dubey and Geanakoplos
(1992)).
Now on, the introduction of ﬁat money into the Arrow-Debreu model may be necessary in
a much simpler setting as the aforementioned. For example, if the non-satiation assumption
does not hold, for any given price, some consumer may wish to consume a commodity bundle
in the interior of his budget set. Therefore a Walras equilibrium may fail to exist. Without
the non-satiation assumption, one may establish existence of an equilibrium by allowing for
the possibility that some agents spend more than the value of their initial endowment. This
generalization of the Walras equilibrium is called dividend equilibrium or equilibrium with
slack (see Makarov (1981), Balasko (1982), Aumann and Dr` eze (1986) and Mas-Colell (1992)
among others). This concept was ﬁrst introduced in a ﬁxed price setting by Dr` eze and M¨ uller
(1980). Indeed, Kajii (1996) shows that this dividend approach is equivalent to considering
Walras equilibria with an additional commodity called ﬁat money. In his setting, ﬁat money
can be consumed in positive quantities, but preferences are independent of the consumption
of it. Thus, if local non-satiation holds, ﬁat money has price zero and we are back in the
Arrow-Debreu setting. However, if satiation problems occur, an equilibrium with price zero
2of ﬁat money may fail to exist. Then, ﬁat money must have a positive price in equilibrium.
In fact, if a consumer does not want to spend his entire income on consumption goods, he
can satisfy his budget constraint as an equality by buying ﬁat money, if this ﬁat money has
a positive price.
In our approach, neither do we use a cash in advance constraint nor do we consider an
inﬁnite horizon, nor do we consider money lump-sum taxation with a zero total money supply.
The positiveness of ﬁat money price is only due to the indivisibility of goods and the role
that this parameter plays in our model.
There also remains some questions related with the properties of the rationing equilibrium
when keeping the level of indivisibility ﬁxed. In parallel papers, we demonstrate a First and
Second Welfare theorems and core equivalence for our equilibrium concept, and we prove
that, under suitable conditions on the economy, a rationing equilibrium converges to a Walras
equilibrium when the level of indivisibilities became small (Florig and Rivera (2004a, 2004b)).
So far, we did not yet allude to the relationship to the rather large literature on indivisible
goods. One could roughly divide it into two approaches. Firstly, following Shapley and Scarf
(1974) markets without a perfectly divisible good, but considering only one commodity per
agent, e.g. houses. Secondly, following Henry (1970), numerous authors (including Broome
(1972), Mas-Colell (1977), Kahn and Yamazaki (1981), Quinzii (1984), see Bobzin (1998)
for a survey) consider economies with indivisible commodities and one perfectly divisible
commodity called money. This should however not be confused with ﬁat money since it is
a crucial consumption good. All these contributions suppose that the divisible commodity
satisﬁes overriding desirability, i.e. it is so desirable by the agents that it can replace the
consumption of indivisible goods. Moreover, every agent initially owns an important quantity
of this good in the sense that no bundle of indivisible goods can yield as much utility as
consuming his initial endowment of the divisible good and nothing of the indivisible one.
Then, non-emptiness of the core and existence of a Walras equilibrium can be established.
The paper which our approach is closest to is Dierker (1971). He proposed a quasi-
equilibrium for exchange economies existing without a perfectly divisible consumption good.
However, at such an equilibrium agents do not necessarily receive an individually rational
commodity bundle.
2 Motivation and examples
Previous to enter in speciﬁc details on the model, in this section we will emphasize three
aspects related with ﬁat money and Walras equilibria that have importance in both the
model and deﬁnitions we are going do in next sections.
(i.) Fiat money may change the set of Walrasian equilibria
Suppose I = f1;2;3g and let ui(x;y) = x¢y be the utility function for individual i 2 I.
Let e1 = (7;0);e2 = (0;3);e3 = (0;4) 2 I R2 be the initial endowment for them. In
this case, there exists a unique Walras equilibrium price p = (1;1) with the equilibrium
allocations x1 = (4;3);x2 = (1;2);x3 = (2;2) and x0
1 = (3;4); x0
2 = (2;1); x0
3 = (2;2).
Suppose now we endow each consumer with an initial amount of ﬁat money, let say,
0 < m1 < 1=8, m2 = 1 and 0 < m3 < 1=2. Given that, it is possible to check that
p¤ = (1; 9
8) 2 I R2
++, q¤ = 1, x¤
1 = (3;3), x¤
2 = (2;2) and x¤
3 = (2;2) is a Walras
equilibrium (with money) for this economy. In this example, the introduction of ﬁat
3money in the economy changes the set of equilibria, even this parameter does not enter
in consumers’ preferences.
(ii.) Without ﬁat money markets may be non viable
Consider an exchange economy with three types of consumers (I = f1;2;3g) and for
each type we have a continuum of them, indexed by compacts and disjoint intervals
Ti µ I R;i 2 I, all of them with identical Lebesgue measure. Suppose that each consumer
choose their consumption bundle on a discrete consumption set Xi = f0;1;2g and that
the utility functions for each type are u1(x) = ¡x, u2(x) = u3(x) = x. Finally, let e1 = 2
and e2 = e3 = 0 be the initial endowment for each type of individual. Given previous
deﬁnitions, we may check that there is no a Walrasian equilibrium in the economy: if
p < 0 then Walrasian demand will be above the total initial endowment of the economy;
if p > 0, the total initial endowment is above demand. However, if we endow consumers’
type 2 and 3 with an initial amount of ﬁat money, let say, m2 = m3 > 0, then it can
be proved that prices p = m2; q = 1, and demands for each type of individual given by
x1 = 0; x2 = x3 = 1, conforms a weak equilibrium for this economy, and it is the only
one with p 6= 01. By other hand, if for instance, m2 = 3; m3 > 0, then p = m2=2; q = 1,
x1 = 0;x2 = 2;x3 = 0 is the unique weak equilibrium with p 6= 0. This example stressed
that in absence of ﬁat money non necessarily exists a Walras equilibrium in the economy
and the introduction of this parameter could implies the existence of a new equilibrium
concept. Unfortunately, the weak equilibrium notion presents serious inconveniences
that oblige us to consider a reﬁnement of it2. This reﬁnement will be called rationing
equilibrium, concept that we will introduce in Section 3.
(iii). A Walras equilibrium may not exists but a rationing equilibrium
Consider an exchange economy with three consumer indexed by I = f1;2;3g and two
goods. Let u1(x;y) = x+2y and u2(x;y) = u3(x;y) = 2x+y be the utility functions for
each individual and let e1 = (0;1);e2 = (1;0);e3 = (1;0) 2 I R2 be the initial endowment
for them. In this case, there exists no Walras equilibrium in the economy and it is easy
to check that p = (1;1) 2 I R2, K = f¹(1;¡1)j ¹ ¸ 0g and demands given by the
initial endowment is a rationing equilibrium (without ﬁat money) for the economy.
Thus, this example show us that in some cases may not exist a Walras equilibrium
but a rationing equilibrium. Indeed, the main result of this work will say that under
very weak assumptions on the economy, provided that for each consumer the initial
endowment of ﬁat money is strictly positive, then a rationing equilibrium will exists,
with price of ﬁat money strictly positive.
3 The model
In this section we introduce deﬁnitions that will play a relevant role in the rest of the paper.
We begin with basic concepts and continue introducing some auxiliary notions that help us
1This auxiliary notion will be introduced in Section 3.
2Consider an exchange economy with three types of consumers (I = f1;2;3g) and for each type there are a
continuum of them, indexed by compact and disjoint intervals Ti µ I R;i 2 I, with identical Lebesgue measure.
Suppose there are two commodities and for all i 2 I, Xi = f0;1;2g
2, u1(x) = ¡x
1 ¡ x





2, e1 = (1;1);e2 = e3 = (0;0) (cf. Konovalov 1998). If m1 = m2 = m3 = 1, then (x;p;q)
with x1 = (0;0), x2 = (0;1), x3 = (1;0) the demand for each type i 2 I consumer, and p = (1;1), q = 1, is
a weak equilibrium. However, once the allocation is realized, consumers of type two and three wish to swap
their allocations leading to »1 = (0;0), »2 = (1;0), »3 = (0;1) as their ﬁnal demand.
4to establish our main result.
3.1 Basic concepts
We set L ´ f1;:::;Lg to denote the ﬁnite set of commodities. Let I ´ f1;:::;Ig and
J ´ f1;:::;Jg be ﬁnite sets of types of identical consumers and producers respectively.
We assume that each type k 2 I;J of agents consists of a continuum of identical indi-
viduals represented by a set Tk ½ I R of ﬁnite Lebesgue measure3. We set I = [i2ITi and
J = [j2JTj. Of course, Tt \ Tt0 = ; if type t and t0 are diﬀerent. Given t 2 I (J); let
i(t) 2 I (j(t) 2 J) be the index such that t 2 Ti(t) (t 2 Tj(t)).
Each ﬁrm of type j 2 J is characterized by a ﬁnite production set Yj ½ I RL and the
aggregate production set of the ﬁrms of type j is the convex hull of ¸(Tj)Yj, which is denoted
by co ¸(Tj)Yj
4.
Every consumer of type i 2 I is characterized by a ﬁnite consumption set Xi ½ RL,
an initial endowment ei 2 I RL and a preference correspondence Pi : Xi ! Xi
5. Let e = P
i2I ¸(Ti)ei be the aggregate initial endowment of the economy. For (i;j) 2 I £ J, µij ¸ 0
is the share of type i consumers in type j ﬁrms. For all j 2 J,
P
i2I ¸(Ti)µij = 1.
The initial endowment of ﬁat money for an individual t 2 I is deﬁned by m(t), where m(¢)
is a Lebesgue-measurable and bounded mapping from I to I R+. Without loss of generality
we may assume that m(¢) is a continuous mapping.
In the rest of this work, we note by L1(A;B) the Lebesgue integrable functions from
A ½ I R to B ½ I RL.






an allocation (or consumption plan) is an element of
X =
n
x 2 L1(I;[i2IXi)jxt 2 Xi(t) fora:e:t 2 I
o
and a production plan is an element of
Y =
n
y 2 L1(J;[j2JYj)jyt 2 Yj(t) fora:e:t 2 J
o
:
Finally, the feasible consumption-production plans are elements of
A(E) =
½










Given p 2 I RL, the weak supply of a ﬁrm of type j 2 J and their aggregate proﬁt are,
respectively,
Sj(p) = argmaxy2Yj p ¢ y ¼j(p) = ¸(Tj)supy2Yj p ¢ y:
3Without loss of generality we may assume that Tk is a compact interval of I R. In the following, we note
by ¸(Tk) the Lebesgue measure of set Tk µ I R.




¸ryr j yr 2 (Tj)Yj; ¸r ¸ 0;
n P
r=0




0 2 Pi(x) if x
0 is strictly preferred to x by a type i 2 I consumer.
5Given (p;q) 2 I RL £ I R+, we denote the budget set of a consumer t 2 I by
Bt(p;q) =
n
x 2 Xi(t) jp ¢ x · wt(p;q)
o
where wt(p;q) = p ¢ ei(t) + qm(t) +
P
j2J µi(t)j¼j(p) is the wealth of individual t 2 I. The set
of maximal elements in the budgetary set for consumer t 2 I is denoted by
dt(p;q) =
n
x 2 Bt(p;q)jBt(p;q) \ Pi(t)(x) = ;
o
and a collection (x;y;p;q) 2 A(E) £ I RL £ I R+ is a Walras equilibrium (with ﬁat money) of
E if
(i) for a.e. t 2 I, xt 2 dt(p;q);
(ii) for a.e. t 2 J, yt 2 Sj(t)(p).
It is well known that in our framework a Walras equilibrium (with ﬁat money) may fail
to exist, mainly because, in general, the correspondence dt(¢) is non upper semi-continuous in
presence of indivisible goods6. This leads us to deﬁne a regularized notion of demand, called




Note that, by deﬁnition, the weak demand is an upper semi-continuous correspondence.
In next section we will give an economical interpretation of it.
In the following, we note by C the set of closed convex cones K ½ I RL such that ¡K\K =
f0I RLg8. Thus, given (p;q;K) 2 I RL £I R+ £C, we deﬁne the demand of a consumer t 2 I by
±t(p;q;K) =
n
x 2 Dt(p;q)jPi(t)(x) ¡ x ½ K
o
and the supply of a ﬁrm t 2 J by
¾t(p;K) =
n
y 2 Sj(t)(p)jYj(t) ¡ y ½ ¡K
o
:
Deﬁnition 3.1 A collection (x;y;p;q;K) 2 A(E)£I RL£I R+£C is a rationing equilibrium
of E if
(i) for a.e. t 2 I, xt 2 ±t(p;q;K);
(ii) for a.e. t 2 J, yt 2 ¾t(p;K).
6For example, given an individual whose preference correspondence (two goods) is deﬁned by the utility
function u(x;y) = 2x + y, his initial endowment is e = (0;1), the consumption set is X = f0;1g
2, then, given
p
n = (1 + 1=n;1) ! p = (1;1); q
n = 0 = q), we obtain that d(p
n;q
n) = (0;1) and d(p;q) = (1;0). Thus, d(¢)
is not upper semi-continuous at p = (1;1).
7See Rockafellar and Wets (1998), Section, 5 for the limsup deﬁnition of a correspondence.
8Those cones are called pointed cones. See Rockafellar and Wets (1998) for more details.





@p ¢ ei(t) + qm(t) +
X
j2J
µi(t)j¼j(p) ¡ p ¢ xt
1
A:
Walras law implies that the money market is in equilibrium at an equilibrium. A Walras
equilibrium with ﬁat money is of course a rationing equilibrium and a rationing equilibrium is
a weak equilibrium. We refer to Kajii (1996) for the links among Walras equilibrium, Walras
equilibrium with ﬁat money and the dividend equilibrium notion.
4 Demand interpretation and a characterization
As we already know, the presence of indivisible goods may implies that in our model a
consumer t 2 I might be unable to obtain a maximal element within his budget set. Should
he be unable to buy » 2 Bi(t)(p;q) with p ¢ » < wi(t)(p;q), then he could try to pay this
bundle at a higher price than the market price in order to be “served ﬁrst”. Thus, there is
some pressure on the price of the bundle » and its price would rise, if a non-negligible set
of consumers is rationing in this sense. So at equilibrium, no consumer obtains a bundle of
goods x 2 Bi(t)(p;q) such that a strictly preferred bundle » with p ¢ » < wi(t)(p;q) exists.
Previous fact could be explained, for instance, if the agents have more information than
their own characteristics and the market price. To eliminate this “instability” it is however not
necessary that the agents have a precise information on their trading partners. It is enough
that they know which kind of net-trades are diﬃcult to realize on the market (which is the
“short” side of the market) when formulating their demand. This short side of the market
could be modelled using a cone K µ I RL which do not contain straight lines, i.e. if a direction
of net-trade is diﬃcult to realize, the opposite direction is easy to realize. One could think of
the new demand as follows. Agents perceive the market price and the cone K (information)
and then they compute their budget set. Given that, they try to ﬁnd out for which type of
allocations they could ﬁnd a counterpart. So an allocation is not acceptable, if there exists
a preferred one in the budget set which costs less than their total wealth. Moreover, they do
not accept an allocation x, if a preferred allocation x0 exists which is contained in the budget
set and such that x0 ¡ x 62 K. In fact, it should not be diﬃcult to ﬁnd a counterpart for
the net-exchange x0 ¡x. Alternatively think that they ﬁrst accept the allocation x, but then
they make another net-exchange x0¡x leading to x0 and so on, until they are at an allocation
» such that Pi(») ¡ » ½ K. At this stage, obtaining a preferred allocation would require a
net-exchange of a direction for which it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a counterpart.
Finally, the following proposition give us an economic interpretation of weak demand.
The most relevant case is when the value of ﬁat money is strictly positive. In such case, we
will prove that for given prices (p;q) 2 I RL £ I R+, the weak demand corresponds to those
allocations that can be aﬀordable by the consumer, such that the budgetary set and the
convex hull of the strictly preferred points to these allocations can be strictly separated by
an hyperplane and any other consumption bundle that is strictly preferred to them is costly.
We recall that in absence of indivisible goods, this characterization coincide with the standard
demand deﬁnition. The proof of the Proposition 4.1 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1 Given t 2 I, we have that:
(a) if qm(t) > 0 then
7Dt(p;q) =
n
x 2 Bt(p;q)j p ¢ Pi(t)(x) ¸ wt(p;q); x 62 coPi(t)(x)
o
;







p ¢ Pi(t)(x) ¸ wt(p;q);
coPi(t)(x) \ cofx;ei(t) +
P
j2J µi(t)j¸(Tj)Yjg = ;
¾
;
(c) if m(t) = 0 then
Dt(p;q) =
n

















To end this section, we point out that the condition x 62 coPi(t)(x) in Proposition 4.1 (i)
is redundant if one considers the demand as deﬁned for the rationing equilibrium.
5 Existence of equilibrium
The strongest condition we use to ensure existence of equilibrium is the ﬁniteness of the
consumption and production sets. The rest of our assumptions are quite weak. In particular,
we do not need a strong survival assumption, that is, our consumers may not own initially a
strictly positive quantity of every good and the interior of the convex hull of the consumption
sets may be empty (cf. Arrow and Debreu (1954)).
Assumption C. For all i 2 I, Pi is irreﬂexive and transitive.
Assumption S. (Weak survival assumption). For all i 2 I,




Following lemma will be very relevant to demonstrate our main theorem. To present this
result, we must introduce an auxiliary concept, called weak equilibrium. Thus, we say that
a collection (x;y;p;q) 2 A(E) £ I RL £ I R+ is a weak equilibrium of E if
(i) for a.e. t 2 I, xt 2 Dt(p;q);
(ii) for a.e. t 2 J, yt 2 Sj(t)(p).
Lemma 5.1 For every economy E satisfying Assumptions C, S, there exists a weak equili-
brium with price of ﬁat money strictly positive.
So now we are in conditions to enunciate our main result.
Theorem 5.1 For every economy E satisfying Assumptions C, S and m(t) > 0 for all t 2 I,
there exists a rationing equilibrium with price of ﬁat money strictly positive.
8As a consequence of Theorem 5.1 we can deduce following corollary, which establish that
under the same hypotheses made on to prove Theorem 5.1, it is possible to conclude the
existence of a Walras equilibrium on E, generically on the distribution of ﬁat money.
Corollary 5.1 For every economy E satisfying Assumptions C, S, m(t) > 0 for all t 2 I
and for all M > 0, ¸(ft 2 I j m(t) = Mg) = 0 there exists a Walras equilibrium with price
of ﬁat money strictly positive.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Part (a). Given t 2 I, let
a(p;q) =
n
x 2 Bt(p;q) j p ¢ Pi(t)(x) ¸ wt(p;q); x 62 coPi(t)(x)
o
:
First of all, note that by deﬁnition Dt(p;q) ½ a(p;q). Let x 2 a(p;q). If p¢x < wt(p;q), then
for all small enough " > 0, x 2 dt(p;q¡") and hence x 2 Dt(p;q). Otherwise, note that there
exists p0 such that p0 ¢ Pi(t)(x) > p0 ¢ x: For all " > 0, let p" = p + "p0 and let
q" =
"






Note that lim"!0(p";q") = (p;q): Moreover for all " > 0,
p" ¢ Pi(t)(x) > p" ¢ x = wt(p";q"):








p ¢ Pi(t)(x) ¸ wt(p;q);
coPi(t)(x) \ cofx;ei(t) +
P
j2J µi(t)j¸(Tj)Yjg = ;
¾
:
Step b.1. A(p;q) ½ Dt(p;q).
Let x 2 A(p;q). Thus, there exists p0 such that










For all " > 0, let p" = p + "p0. Thus, for all " > 0,










p" ¢ Pi(t)(x) > wt(p";q):
Let9
q" = q +
·





9For x 2 I R, we note [x]+ = maxfx;0g.
9Note that lim"!0(p";q") = (p;q) and moreover for all " > 0,
p" ¢ Pi(t)(x) > wt(p";q") ¸ p" ¢ x
and therefore x 2 Dt(p;q):
Step b.2. Dt(p;q) ½ A(p;q).
For all x 2 Dt(p;q), there exists sequences (pn;qn) converging to (p;q), such that for all
n 2 I N
pn ¢ Pi(t)(x) > wt(pn;qn) ¸ pn ¢ x:




















p ¢ Pi(t)(x) ¸ wt(p;q);
coPi(t)(x) \ C(p;x) = ;
¾
:
Step c.1. c(p) ½ Dt(p;q).
Given x 2 c(p) there exists p0 such that







A ¸ p0 ¢ x:
Thus, for all " > 0, given p" = p + "p0 it follows that















A ¸ p" ¢ x:
Moreover, since Yj is ﬁnite for all j 2 J, we may check that for all " > 0 small enough
and all j 2 J,
argmax¼j(p") ½ argmax¼j(p)
and therefore for all small " > 0,
minp" ¢ Pi(t)(x) > wt(p";q) ¸ p" ¢ x;
which implies that x 2 Dt(p;q).
Step c.2. Dt(p;q) ½ c(p).
Let x 2 Dt(p;q). Then there exists a sequence pn converging to p such that for all n 2 I N,
pn ¢ Pi(t)(x) > wt(pn;q) ¸ pn ¢ x:






















we can conclude that x 2 c(p). 2
6.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
In order to demonstrate Lemma 5.1 we use the following proposition, which is an extension
of the well know Debreu-Gale-Nikaido lemma.
Proposition 6.1 Let " 2]0;1] and ' be an upper semi continuous correspondence from
I B(0;") to I RL with nonempty, convex, compact values10. If for some k > 0,
8p0 2 I B(0;"); kp0k = " =) supp0 ¢ '(p0) · k(1 ¡ ");
then there exists p 2 I B(0;") such that, either:
² 0 2 '(p)
or
² kpk = " and 9 » 2 '(p) such that » and p are colinear and k»k · k1¡"
" .
Proof of Proposition 6.1.
¿From the properties of ', one can select a convex compact subset K ½ I RL such that




q 2 I B(0;") j 8q0 2 I B(0;"); q ¢ z ¸ q0 ¢ z
ª
£ '(p):
From Kakutani Theorem, F has a ﬁxed point (p;»). If kpk < ", then » = 0. If kpk = ",
then from the deﬁnition of F, p and » are colinear. Therefore, k»k · k 1¡"
" , which ends the
demonstration. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.1
Previous to proceed, is necessary to introduce some notations. We note by ·lex the
lexicographic order11. Given p0;:::;pk 2 I RL, for a (k + 1) £ L matrix P = [p0;:::;pk]0
(transpose of matrix [p0;:::;pk]), we note for every j 2 J;
Sj(P) = fy 2 Yj j 8z 2 Yj; Pz ·lex Pyg ¼j(P) = ¸(Tj)suplexfPy j y 2 Yjg
10I B(0;") = fx 2 I R
L j kxk · "g: The norm used here is Euclidean norm.
11For (x;y) 2 I R
n £ I R
n, x ·lex y, if xr > yr, r 2 f1;:::;ng implies that 9½ 2 f1;:::;r ¡ 1g such that
x½ < y½. We write x <lex y if x ·lex y, but not [y ·lex x]. In an obvious manner we deﬁne x ¸lex y and
x >lex y.
11where suplex is the supremum with respect to the lexicographic order. Given Q = (qr) 2











and ﬁnally, for " > 0, we note P(") =
Pk
r=0 "rpr and Q(") =
Pk
r=0 "rqr: So now we are in
conditions to demonstrate the result. To do so, we proceed in nine steps.
Step 1. Perturbed equilibria.
For simplicity, for all t 2 I we note Dt(p) instead of Dt(p;1¡kpk). Given that, it is easy
to check that for all " 2 [0;1], all t 2 I, and all j 2 J the set-valued mappings
Dt : I B(0;") ! coXi(t) coSj : I B(0;") ! coYj
are upper semi-continuous, nonempty and compact valued.
Now, deﬁne the excess demand mapping
' : I B (0;1 ¡ 1=n) !
X
i2I












Obviously '(¢) is nonempty, convex, compact valued and upper semi-continuous. For each
n 2 I N and each p 2 I B(0;1 ¡ 1=n) we have that











L1(Tj;Sj(pn)) £ I B (0;1 ¡ 1=n) £ I R++
such that for all t 2 I, xn
























Step 2. Construction of P and Q.
For the construction of a hierarchic price we will proceed as in Florig (2002). For that, our
objective is to deﬁne a set of vectors fÃ0;Ã1;:::;ÃLg µ I RL+1 which help us to deﬁne both
P and Q as required. To do so, set Ãn = (pn;qn) and taking a subsequence, we may assume
that Ãn converges to (p0;q0) 2 I RL+1. Let Ã0; Ãn





0 = fx 2 RL+1 j Ã0 ¢ x = 0g:
12Using a recursive procedure, for every r 2 f1;2;:::;L ¡ 1g we deﬁne Ãr; Ãn





and given that, if for all large enough n 2 I N, Ãn
r 6= 0, then let Ãr ´ (pr;qr) be the limit of
Ãn
r = k Ãn







We continue with previous algorithm until for all large enough n 2 I N, Ãn
r = 0 for some
subsequence. In such case, we set Ãr = ::: = ÃL = 0 and deﬁne
k = minfr 2 f0;:::;Lg j Ãr+1 = ::: = ÃL = 0g:
Given all foregoing, we had obtained a set fÃr = (pr;qr); r = 1;:::;kg of orthonormal
vectors. Note that for all r 2 f0;:::;kg12,
° °Ãn
r+1
° ° = kÃn
r ko(kÃn
r k)













r k ¡ k Ãn
r+1 k for r 2 f0;:::;kg. Thus, "n
r+1 = "n
ro("n
r) for r 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g,
and "n
0 converges to 1.
Let P = [p0;:::;pk]0 (transpose of matrix [p0;:::;pk]), and Q = (q0;q1;:::;qk) 2 I Rk+1.
Step 3. Equilibrium allocation candidate.
There exists by Fatou’s lemma (Arstein (1979)) (x¤;y¤) 2 A(E) such that for a.e. t 2 I






Step 4. For all " > 0 small enough and all n large enough, for a.e. t 2 J,
y¤
t 2 Sj(t)(P(")) = Sj(t)(pn) = Sj(t)(P):
Since for all j 2 J, Yj is ﬁnite, for all " > 0 small enough and for all j 2 J we have that
Sj(P(")) = Sj(P) and similarly, for n 2 I N large enough, for all j 2 J, Sj(pn) = Sj(P). Since
for a.e. t 2 J, yn
t 2 Sj(t)(pn) for all n 2 I N, and since y¤
t 2 clfyn
t g, yn
t is constant and equal
to y¤
t for a subsequence. Thus, y¤
t 2 Sj(t)(P).
Let ½ be the smallest r 2 f0;:::;kg such that qr 6= 0. Since for all n 2 I N, qn > 0,
q½ > 0. Let e P = [p0;:::;p½]0 and e Q = (q0;:::;q½). For all j 2 J, let ¯ yj = y¤
t, provided that
y¤
t 2 Sj(P). Since that Sj(P) ½ Sj( e P), ¯ yj 2 Sj( e P).
12Throughout the paper we denote by o : R ! R a function which is continuous in 0 with o(0) = 0.
13In the following, he closure of set A is denoted by clA.
13Step 5. For a.e. t 2 I, x¤
t 2 Bt( e P; e Q).
By the previous step, one may check that Bt(pn;qn) converges in the sense of Kuratowski
- Painlev´ e to Bt(P;Q)14. Thus x¤
t 2 Bt(P;Q) ½ Bt( e P; e Q).
Step 6. For all " > 0 small enough, for a.e. t 2 I, x¤
t 2 Bt( e P("); e Q(")).
For a.e. t 2 I, we have, by the previous step, that x¤
t 2 Bt( e P("); e Q(")) for all small
enough " > 0. Since m : I ! I R+ is bounded and since there are only ﬁnitely many values
for x¤
t, there exists " > 0 satisfying this property for a.e. t 2 I.
Step 7. For a.e. t 2 I, xt 2 Pi(t)(x¤
t) implies that
e P ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ m(t) e Q ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¼j( e P) ¸lex 0:
Otherwise
e P ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ m(t) e Q ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¸(Tj) e P¯ yj <lex 0
and then for all large enough n 2 I N,
pn ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ qnm(t) ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¸(Tj)pn ¢ ¯ yj < 0:
By Proposition 4.1, this contradicts x¤
t 2 Dt(pn;qn) for a subsequence of (pn;qn).
Step 8. For all " > 0 small enough, for a.e t 2 I, xt 2 Pi(t)(x¤
t) implies that
e P(") ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ e Q(")m(t) ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¼j( e P(")) ¸ 0:
Since Xi is ﬁnite, there exists a ﬁnite partition f e T1;:::; e Tfg of I such that the sets Bt( e P; e Q)
are constant on each of the elements of the partition. We may choose the partition such
that for every s 2 f1;:::;fg, there exists i 2 I such that e Ts ½ Ti and x¤
t is constant on e Ts.
Let ms = essupfm(t) j t 2 e Tsg (essential supremum) and suppose for all ¯ " > 0, there exists
" 2]0; ¯ "] such that
e P(") ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ ms e Q(") ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¸(Tj) e P(") ¢ ¯ yj < 0:
Thus there exists ´ 2]0;ms] such that for all large n 2 I N,
pn ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ qn(ms ¡ ´) ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¸(Tj)pn ¢ ¯ yj < 0:
Hence, for all large n 2 I N there exists ¯ Ts ½ e Ts with ¸(¯ Ts) > 0 such that for a.e. t 2 ¯ Ts
pn ¢ (xt ¡ ei(t)) ¡ qnm(t) ¡
X
j2J
µi(t)j¸(Tj)pn ¢ ¯ yj < 0:
By Proposition 4.1, this contradicts x¤
t 2 Dt(pn;qn) for a subsequence of (pn;qn).
Step 9. For all " > 0 small enough, for a.e. t 2 I, x¤
t 2 Dt((P(");(Q(")).
Let ¯ " > 0 small enough satisfying the previous steps. Let (p¤;q¤) =
P½
r=0 ¯ "r(pr;qr).
By Proposition 4.1, x¤
t 62 coPi(t)(x¤
t). Then, since q¤ > 0 and for a.e. t 2 I, m(t) > 0, we
can deduce by Proposition 4.1 that x¤
t 2 Dt((P(");(Q(")).
Thus, (x¤;y¤;p¤;q¤) is a weak equilibrium and q¤ > 0. 2
14This concept is widely used to deﬁne set - convergence. See Rockafellar and Wets (1998), Section 4, for
more details.
146.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let m1 : I ! I R++ be a mapping strictly increasing and bounded and let (x0;y0;p0;q0) be a
weak equilibrium of E. Let E1 be an economy deﬁned as follows. Since the number of types
is ﬁnite and the consumption sets are ﬁnite, we can deﬁne a ﬁnite set of consumer types
A ´ f1;:::;Ag satisfying the following:
(i) (Ta)a2A is a ﬁner partition of I than (Ti)i2I,
(ii) for every a 2 A, there exists xa such that for every t 2 Ta, x0
t = xa.
Set X1
a = (Pa(xa) [ xa) \ (xa + (p0)?) and e1
a = xa, with P1
a the restriction of Pa to X1
a.
Since there is also a ﬁnite number of types of producers and production sets are ﬁnite,
we can deﬁne a ﬁnite set of producer types B ´ f1;:::;Bg satisfying the following:
(i) (Tb)b2B is a ﬁner partition of J than (Tj)j2J,
(ii) for every b 2 B, there exists yb such that for every t 2 Tb, y0
t = yb.
Given Y 1










where m1 deﬁnes the initial endowments of ﬁat money. The economy E1 satisﬁes Assumptions
C, S. So by the Lemma 5.1 there exists a weak equilibrium with q1 > 0 and therefore a Walras
equilibrium (with ﬁat money) for the economy E1, which is denoted by (x1;y1;p1;q1), with
q1 > 0. Set P = [p0;p1]0.
Claim 6.1 For a.e. t 2 I, Px1
t ·lex wt with wt = (w0
t;w1
t) 2 I R2 such that
w0






t = p1 ¢ e1





Note that by the construction of X1
t , we have for a.e. t 2 I, p0 ¢ x0
t = p0 ¢ x1
t. Since for
every r 2 f0;1g, pr ¢ xr
t · wr
t we have for a.e. t 2 I, Px1
t ·lex wt. By other hand, note that
for all t 2 J, yt = y0
t + y1
t 2 Sj(t)(P).
Claim 6.2 For a.e. t 2 I, »t 2 Pi(t)(x1
t) implies Px1
t <lex P»t:
By transitivity of the preferences, »t 2 Pi(t)(x1




t · p1 ¢ »t. Since (x1;y1;p1;q1) is a Walras equilibrium of E1, p1 ¢ x1
t < p0 ¢ »t for a.e.
t 2 I.
Set (¯ x; ¯ y; ¯ p; ¯ q) = (x1;y;p1;q1), with yt as in Claim 6.1. Let K0 = fx 2 I RL j (0;0) <lex
Pxg [ f0g: Clearly this is a convex and pointed cone (that is, ¡K0 \ K0 = f0g). Since
for all t 2 J, yt 2 Sj(t)(P), we have for all t 2 J, Yj(t) ¡ yt ½ ¡K0. For all t 2 J, let
Kt be the positive hull of K0 \ (yt ¡ Yj(t)). Note that for all t 2 I, if xt 2 Pi(t)(¯ xt), then
(0;0) <lex P(xt ¡ ¯ xt). For all t 2 I, let Kt be the positive hull of K0 \ (Pi(t)(¯ xt) ¡ ¯ xt). Let
K = clfco [t2I[J Ktg. Of course K is a convex cone and by the ﬁniteness of the consumption
and production sets K ½ K0. Thus, ¡K \ K = f0g. For all t 2 I, Pi(t)(¯ xt) ¡ ¯ xt ½ K, for all
t 2 J, Yj(t) ¡ ¯ yt ½ ¡K, which ends the proof. 2
156.4 Proof of Corollary 5.1
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